Can Delhi Become an International Aviation Hub? Route Costs and Connectivity
Does India's geographical advantage translate into an economic advantage for airlines? A route-cost model of Delhi against Dubai across Europe–Asia-Pacific itineraries.

Photo: Biswarup Ganguly · CC BY 3.0
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I have been thinking a lot recently about India's potential to become a global aviation hub. The argument begins with a striking geographical claim: approximately 65% of the world's population lives within a five-to-six-hour flight radius of India, according to IndiGo's CEO, Pieter Elbers, in 2023. Geography alone does not make a hub, but it gives India an important starting advantage. Positioned between Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the fast-growing markets of East and Southeast Asia, India sits at the intersection of several major international travel corridors.
What makes this possibility particularly interesting is the economic transformation taking place across these regions. South Asia is experiencing rising incomes and expanding demand for international travel. China and Southeast Asia remain important engines of global aviation growth, while the Gulf economies combine high purchasing power with strong international connectivity. As more consumers travel for business, leisure, education and family visits, the potential market for air travel connecting these regions continues to expand. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) projects that global passenger demand will more than double by 2050, with Asia-Pacific among the fastest-growing regions. The opportunity, therefore, is not simply that India is geographically well positioned, but that it lies between markets whose aviation demand is expected to grow substantially.
The Indian government has recognised this ambition, setting a goal of making India the preferred aviation hub for Indian travellers by 2030 and a leading global hub by 2047. Its International Aviation Hub Strategy and Hub-and-Spoke initiatives are steps towards reducing dependence on overseas transit airports and strengthening international connectivity through Indian hubs.
Does India's geographical advantage translate into an economic advantage for airlines?
I began by screening 400 Europe–Asia-Pacific origin–destination city pairs across 10 potential hubs, using airport coordinates from OurAirports and the haversine formula to calculate great-circle distances. For each pair, we compared the direct distance with the distance routed through Delhi, Dubai and eight other hubs, calculating routing factors and identifying where Delhi offered a geographical advantage. We then selected 15 illustrative city pairs for a more detailed cost comparison, estimating itinerary costs using airline-level cost per available seat-kilometre (CASK) proxies, a representative 300-seat aircraft and published landing tariffs for Delhi and Dubai. Sensitivity analysis tested how the results changed under alternative Indian airline cost assumptions, while a separate top-down exercise explored hypothetical demand-capture scenarios to illustrate the potential scale of the opportunity. These are screening estimates rather than forecasts: the city pairs are not demand-weighted, great-circle distances approximate rather than reproduce actual flight paths, and the model does not establish realised savings or network profitability. (Check out the underlying Excel model, detailed assumptions, formulas and source register through the supporting documents linked at the end of this article)
Finding 1: Delhi has a geographic advantage across the 400-route screening universe#
Delhi’s route is shorter than Dubai’s for 376 pairs (94%), with a mean saving of 577 km. Delhi has the lowest routing factor among all ten hubs for 58 pairs, while 341 pairs (85.25%) can be routed via Delhi within 20% of the direct great-circle distance. Dubai is geographically shorter for the remaining 24 pairs. These results indicate a potential routing advantage.
Finding 2: Geography and Unit Costs Combine to Produce a Modelled Cost Advantage#
Having established that Delhi offers a routing advantage over Dubai across most of the 400 city pairs screened, the next question is whether that advantage translates into lower operating costs. To examine this, we selected 15 illustrative Europe–Asia-Pacific routes and compared the modelled cost of operating each itinerary via Delhi against the Dubai baseline. The routes were chosen purposively to cover different markets where Delhi showed distance-saving potential; they are neither a random sample nor a demand-weighted representation of all 400 pairs.
The central scenario uses a representative 300-seat aircraft, an Indian-carrier cost per available seat-kilometre (CASK) proxy of 7.0 US cents and an Emirates CASK of 8.009 US cents. But first, what is CASK? Cost per Available Seat KM. You take total number of planes, figure out how many seats all of them have and multiply that by total number of kilometres that the plane flew (this is ASK). This is an airline level figure, and tells u the capacity of the airline. Next, we will take total cost of the airline and divide it by ASK, to get total CASK per seat. This is a good way to tell how much each seat costs. For a comparison, Indigo’s CASK is about 5.2 US cents, which is fair given that it’s a LCC, operating with narrowbody planes, primarily flying within India. Emirates is over 8 cents, but it operates only widebody planes.
By changing the routing distance and assumed unit costs separately, the model distinguishes the contribution of geography from that of airline cost structures. Across the 15 routes, the full Delhi/Indian-carrier case produces a modelled cost advantage of 15.99% relative to the Emirates/Dubai baseline, before the separate landing-charge adjustment. However, geography alone accounts for only 3.87 percentage points of this advantage, compared with 12.60 percentage points attributable to the assumed difference in unit costs. The interaction between the two effects offsets a further 0.49 percentage points. In this decomposition, geography therefore contributes approximately 23.1% of the total modelled advantage, with the larger share arising from the lower Indian CASK assumed in the central scenario.
The route geometry provides useful context for interpreting these results. Across the 15 selected pairs, the mean distance saving via Delhi is approximately 450 km, while the mean Delhi routing factor is 1.008. In other words, the routed distance via Delhi is, on average, about 0.8% longer than the direct great-circle distance. Delhi's advantage over Dubai therefore does not necessarily mean that every Delhi itinerary is close to a direct route; rather, it means that Delhi is generally the shorter of the two hub routings in this sample.
A further test is how much the assumed Indian unit cost could rise before the modelled advantage disappears. The mean break-even Indian CASK is approximately 8.34 US cents per available seat-kilometre, with route-level thresholds ranging from 8.10 to 8.64 cents. Below these thresholds, the simplified Delhi itinerary remains cheaper than the Emirates/Dubai baseline under the model's assumptions; above them, that advantage disappears. These thresholds are not airline-profit break-even points: they identify where the two modelled itinerary costs become equal before landing charges.
- Geography effect: Cost reduction from routing the same aircraft through Delhi instead of Dubai, holding CASK constant.
- Unit-cost effect: Cost reduction from using the lower assumed Indian CASK instead of Emirates’ CASK, holding the route via Dubai constant.
- Interaction effect: The additional change arising when both routing distance and CASK change together, beyond the sum of their individual effects.
The finding is therefore twofold. First, the model identifies a cost advantage under its central assumptions, but geography alone does not explain most of it. The assumed difference in airline unit costs is the larger contributor. Second, the break-even CASK analysis suggests that the comparison can tolerate some increase in Indian unit costs, although the size of the advantage remains sensitive to the assumptions used. These are modelled cost differences, not realised savings or proof of profitability; whether an airline could capture them commercially depends on demand, feasible connections and the full cost of operating the network.
Finding 3: The Cost Advantage Remains Positive Across Tested CASK Scenarios—but Narrows Sharply#
The next question is: how sensitive is this advantage to the cost structure of an Indian carrier? I took an analysis between 5.29 to 9 US cents across the same 15 routes. (All of this is excluding landing charges, to isolate how changes in unit costs affect the relative advantage, given that that makes up the biggest chunk of our cost advantage).
I find that Delhi's geographical position can help offset higher unit costs, but it cannot compensate indefinitely for cost inefficiency. The model continues to show a small mean advantage at 8.0 cents/ASK, but that margin is considerably thinner than in the central case. These results are conditional on the selected routes and cost assumptions; they do not establish that operating through Delhi would be profitable.
The workbook also translates the comparison into illustrative dollar values for a representative 300-seat aircraft operating at an 85% load factor, equivalent to 255 occupied seats. Including the separate landing-charge adjustment, the mean modelled cost difference across the 15 selected itineraries is approximately $9,276 per itinerary, or $36.38 per occupied passenger, under the 6.7-cent scenario. Under the central 7.0-cent scenario, the corresponding figures are $9,681 per itinerary and $37.97 per occupied passenger. At 8.0 cents/ASK, the model reports $11,030 per itinerary, or $43.26 per occupied passenger. Geography may provide a useful starting point, but maintaining a competitive cost base is essential if that advantage is to translate into a viable connecting operation. The model quantifies this cost-side opportunity; it does not establish realised savings, passenger demand or airline profitability.
The central Indian CASK assumption of 7.0¢/ASK, LHR–MNL, LHR–BKK and LHR–SGN deliver the strongest advantages, at 18.94%, 18.66% and 18.37%, respectively, followed by AMS–HKT at 17.39%. These routes also remain the strongest candidates when the assumed Indian CASK rises to 8.0¢/ASK: their advantages remain positive at 7.36%, 7.05%, 6.71% and 5.59%, respectively.
The weaker routes are more sensitive to the assumed cost base. Under the 8.0¢/ASK stress scenario, FRA–MEL retains only a 1.18% modelled advantage, followed by LHR–MEL at 1.40% and CDG–SYD at 1.74%. These results suggest that the cost case for these routes is much less robust to higher Indian operating costs or other expenses excluded from the model.
At 8.0¢/ASK, the modelled cost advantage ranges from approximately $4,700 per itinerary for FRA–MEL to $21,900 for LHR–MNL; these are illustrative cost differences.
Finding 4: How Much is Delhi’s Addressable Opportunity?#
To estimate the scale of the opportunity, a separate top-down model starts with India’s international passenger traffic, narrows this to journeys currently using foreign hubs, and applies explicit scenarios for the share of that market potentially relevant to Delhi and the share Delhi might capture.
From national traffic to the foreign-hub market. First, 81.13 million international passenger movements at Indian airports in calendar 2025, as cited in the Ministry of Civil Aviation source recorded in the sheet. Assuming arrivals and departures are approximately balanced, dividing this figure by two gives an estimated 40.57 million outbound one-way journeys. Applying the cited estimate that nearly 35% of international passengers travelling from India transit through foreign hubs produces a potential national pool of approximately 14.20 million outbound journeys annually.
This figure is a starting point, not Delhi’s addressable market. Some journeys will be geographically unsuitable for Delhi, better served by direct flights, or more attractive through competing hubs. Since the precise relevant market and achievable Delhi share have not been established, I use three sensitivity scenarios:
| Scenario | Relevant corridor share | Delhi capture rate | Potential journeys captured annually |
|---|---|---|---|
| Low | 10% | 5% | ~71,000 |
| Central | 20% | 10% | ~284,000 |
| High | 30% | 20% | ~852,000 |
Under the central scenario, 20% of the 14.20 million journeys are assumed to fall within potentially relevant corridors, yielding an addressable pool of approximately 2.84 million journeys. Applying an assumed 10% Delhi capture rate produces an estimated 284,000 journeys annually. The low and high scenarios produce approximately 71,000 and 852,000 journeys, respectively. These are illustrative outcomes of analyst-selected assumptions, not forecasts or demonstrated passenger demand.
Translating passenger capture into a modelled cost opportunity. Let’s now consider how much money is on the table. Under the central Indian CASK assumption of 7.0¢/ASK, the mean modelled cost difference is $37.97 per occupied passenger. Multiplying this figure by the passenger scenarios produces equivalent annual cost differences of approximately $2.70 million in the low case, $10.78 million in the central case and $32.34 million in the high case.
Here are alternative Indian CASK assumptions while holding the passenger volumes constant:
| Indian CASK scenario | Cost difference per occupied passenger | Low case | Central case | High case |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.7¢/ASK | $36.38 | $2.58m | $10.33m | $30.99m |
| 7.0¢/ASK | $37.97 | $2.70m | $10.78m | $32.34m |
| 8.0¢/ASK | $43.26 | $3.07m | $12.28m | $36.85m |
A potential cost advantage matters only if the airport can accommodate the flights and connections needed to realise it. Delhi’s existing scale provides an encouraging starting point, although headline passenger capacity alone cannot establish whether a larger international connecting network would be operationally feasible.
For context, Delhi Airport handled 79.3 million passengers in FY2024–25. In April 2026, the Ministry of Civil Aviation stated that the airport’s annual passenger-handling capacity exceeded 100 million. Using 100 million as a conservative capacity benchmark suggests an indicative difference of 20.7 million passengers annually.
Here is something else, 1.34 million international-to-international transfer passengers in FY2025 and 670,000 East–West transfer passengers between September 2024 and August 2025. The latter is particularly relevant to the Europe–Asia connecting opportunity examined in this article.
Can Noida International Airport expand the opportunity?#
Noida International Airport could increase the capacity available to the wider Delhi National Capital Region. Its stated initial passenger-handling capacity is 12 million passengers annually, with planned expansion to 70 million upon completion of the development phases.
Noida’s contribution would depend on airline basing decisions, international services, transfer arrangements and surface connectivity with Delhi. A bus or other ground connection could improve access between the airports, but it would not provide the same experience as a seamless airside connection between flights.
But, we digress.
The route-level model identifies a potential cost advantage, while the top-down model estimates the passenger volumes that Delhi might capture under different assumptions. Combining these two analyses gives an indication of the scale of the opportunity. Across the 15 illustrative Europe–Asia-Pacific itineraries, the central cost scenario estimates a mean cost difference of approximately $9,681 per itinerary, or $37.97 per occupied passenger, for a representative 300-seat aircraft operating at an 85% load factor. The calculation incorporates the modelled routing distances, the assumed Indian and Emirates cost bases, and a separate landing-charge adjustment.
So if we annualise the route-level differences using an illustrative assumption of five qualifying flights per week on each of the 15 routes. Under the Indian central-cost scenario, this produces an annualised modelled cost-difference value of approximately $37.8 million.
This figure is conditional on the assumed frequency. Five flights per week on each route has not been validated against actual connecting demand or the availability of suitable aircraft and schedules. Moreover, many of the origin–destination pairs do not have direct flights through Delhi today: serving them as connecting markets would require compatible flights on both legs. The model does not fully incorporate the cost of building and operating such a network, including additional frequencies, aircraft deployment, crew, transfer handling, distribution and schedule coordination.
Under its central scenario, Delhi captures approximately 284,000 journeys annually from an assumed addressable pool of 2.84 million. Applying the central modelled cost difference of $37.97 per occupied passenger produces an equivalent annual cost difference of approximately $10.78 million. The low and high scenarios produce approximately $2.70 million and $32.34 million, respectively.
Why Would Emirates Continue to Favour Dubai?#
A successful hub depends on more than distance or operating costs; it requires an integrated network of schedules, connections, fleet deployment and passenger demand.
Emirates has built its international operations around Dubai, with coordinated schedules, onward connections and transfer processes. Recreating this network in Delhi would require compatible flight frequencies, traffic rights and reliable connections. Dubai also benefits from an established customer base and a broad destination network that a competing hub cannot replicate immediately. Dubai International handled 92.3 million passengers in 2024, while transfer traffic accounted for 44% of total traffic in the first half of 2024.
And then there is fuel. The model’s CASK assumptions already include fuel, so fuel savings cannot be added separately without adjusting the calculations. Delhi’s published FY2026–27 widebody landing tariff has a 32% difference in the tariff on domestic flights as compared to international flights. To read more about what makes up a successful geographic hub, and how India performs as compared to other hubs, check this out: Link.
Ultimately, India’s geographic position offers a credible starting point for building a stronger international aviation hub, but geography alone cannot displace an established network such as Dubai. The analysis identifies a modelled cost advantage across selected Europe–Asia-Pacific routes and illustrates a potentially meaningful opportunity under alternative passenger-capture and operating-cost assumptions; however, it does not yet demonstrate that the required demand, capacity, connections or profitability exist. Realising this opportunity will require competitive airline economics, seamless transfers, coordinated schedules, usable airport capacity and strong international network carriers.
This analysis builds on the established literature on airport hub competition and on prior industry commentary concerning India's potential to compete with established international hubs. The estimates are illustrative rather than forecasts and do not establish realised savings, passenger demand or network profitability.


